Monday, 25 July 2016

Pokémon Go: Philosophy Examination

Philosophy Examination

Subject: Pokémon Go

Answer as many questions as take your fancy

Time allowed: for as long as you have nothing better to do

Note: this examination is based on a simplified version of Pokémon Go, which is not identical to the actual game. The broad idea of capturing different monsters which appear on the screen of a mobile phone when one is in the right area is carried over from the actual game. Other features which are to be assumed are indicated by the questions. Candidates may assume such other features as are reasonable given what the questions ask, so long as no assumptions which would make the questions trivial to answer are made.

1. Assume that when several people are at the same location, surrounding a table, they can all see a monster in the middle of that table, and they see it in ways that reflect their relative positions. (For example, if someone facing south sees the monster face-on, someone facing west sees its right hand side.) And when a viewer moves round the table, his or her view of the monster changes accordingly.

(a) Under what additional conditions, if any, would this be evidence that the monster was real?

(b) What kind of evidence, if any, would help to settle the question of whether the viewers saw one monster or numerically distinct but qualitatively identical monsters?

(c) How would your answer to (b) be affected by whether the monster disappeared from all screens when it was captured by one of the viewers?

2. Assume that a monster is at an absolutely fixed position relative to the Earth's surface. Does it exist when no-one is looking at it?

3. What conditions, if any, of numerical identity over time could be applied to monsters?

4. New monsters are supposed to come out of eggs which have been fertilized and laid following an encounter between two monsters, and the species of a new monster is systematically related to the mother's ancestry. (It seems that these facts are known from other Pokémon games, rather than from Go.) But it appears that no-one has seen a monster lay an egg, and the eggs are simply found.

(a) Is inference to the breeding-and-laying account an example of inference to the best explanation?

(b) Is it a respectable inference (of whatever type it may be)?

5. Monsters are apparently distributed in a way that is positively correlated with human population density. Such a distribution would give people in rural areas very limited access to monsters, unless they travelled to urban areas.

(a) Assuming that there is a cost to the creation and maintenance of monsters, which is a cost per monster unrelated to the location of the monster or the number of other monsters near it, would such a distribution policy accord with utilitarian principles?

(b) If you were behind Rawls's veil of ignorance, would you approve of such a distribution policy?

6. Some of these questions come out of a conversation between the examiner and a (human) interlocutor who is happy to remain anonymous. Other people may have already had and published the same or similar thoughts.

(a) If thoughts which are qualitatively identical to those set out in the questions here have already been captured by others, do they count as captured by the examiner and the interlocutor, and do they get points for capturing them?

(b) Is there any identity other than qualitative identity for (i) thoughts (ii) Pokémon monsters?

Tuesday, 28 April 2015

Buridan's ass

Buridan's ass thought he had the answer. Each time he could not decide between two bales of hay, he would toss a coin. If it came up heads, he would start with the bale on the right; if tails, he would start with the bale on the left.

But there would be an equally good rule, heads-left, tails-right. How could he decide between these two rules?

Then he had another idea. He would build an electronic device with a loudspeaker and a button. When he pushed the button, it would randomly say "Right" or "Left", and he would follow its instruction. It would not matter whether it was genuinely random, or determined but as near random as made no difference (for example, if it picked up whatever radio waves happened to be around and used them to decide when to stop a counter that was flipping left-right a million times a second). He did not have to worry about every philosophical problem.

But the device would not have any notion of the meanings of the words "right" and "left". It would be like the person handling the dictionaries inside Searle's Chinese room. So the ass would have to make an arbitrary choice between the rule that said the sound of the word "right" meant he was to choose the bale on the right, and the equally good rule that it meant he was to choose the bale on the left.

He began to wonder whether there was any way to get rid of the arbitrariness, as opposed to just moving it to a different place. Perhaps there could not be. Perhaps for any rule or system of rules, there would have to be a mirror image rule or system that would always have the opposite effect. This might be an inevitable result of the symmetry of the situation that created the problem.

At this point he felt hungry. He went out into the yard, and was very pleased to see that there was only one bale of hay. And as it was directly in front of him, he would start by eating the middle part of it.

Sunday, 1 March 2015


Oxford University Press have kindly sent me a review copy of Tetralogue: I'm Right, You're Wrong, by Timothy Williamson. It is an introduction to a wide range of philosophical problems, presented as a conversation between four people on a train.

Dialogues have a distinguished history in philosophy: think of Plato, Berkeley and Hume. Many such dialogues steer the reader gently but firmly towards the author's preferred solutions. This one is different. The problems are put in front of us. Some sketches of solutions are identified, and are explored sufficiently to show us that they could not easily be worked up into fully developed solutions with which all would be comfortable. But we are neither told nor shown that one sketch is the right one upon which to concentrate. The reader who asks "What sort of thing does Timothy Williamson want me to think about this?" will get no answer, whether "this" be relativism, vague language, the primacy of science, the status of logic or the nature of ethical claims. Readers can reach their own conclusions, but they need to work at reaching them for themselves. They also need to be wary of identifying with any one of the four participants and then casually agreeing with the chosen one. The participants have such different outlooks that it would be easy to take to one and against the others. Bob insists on making room for the unscientific, Sarah has no truck with such nonsense, Zac is a relativist who always knows that he can be helpful, and Roxana is the Queen of Logic.

For whom is the book? The beginner in philosophy will engage with serious philosophical questions without realizing it. Those who are steeped in the western philosophical tradition will enjoy the many allusions to writers, problems and solutions that are hidden in the dialogue. The benefits to these contrasting readers draw our attention to a third reader, who will get more out of the book than either of the first two. This is the beginner who has the benefit of guidance from an expert who can show where there is more to the dialogue than meets the eye, and who can push the beginner to use the dialogue as a springboard for his or her own arguments. This would be a very good book to use in an informal course for adult or teenage beginners, a course that was aimed at broadening the mind while having fun rather than at passing an examination.

The allusions pose a puzzle. Some of them must be deliberate. For example, on pages 35-36 Zac adopts the voice of Plato's Socrates to commit Sarah to a position with which she is not at all comfortable. Others may or may not have been planted by the author. On page 134, we have a suggestion that we should take into account only the views of those who can look at things from all relevant points of view (those who are both accountants and soccer fans in this case). Is this a deliberate allusion to Mill's justification for preferring the opinion of Socrates to that of the fool, and the opinion of the human being to that of the pig (Utilitarianism, chapter 2)? Or is that connection created solely by the reader? And if the author did not intend the allusion, does it still qualify as an allusion? We might go on to distinguish the case where it was unintended but the words were a consequence of the author's having read Mill from the case where there was no causal connection between that reading and what the author wrote, and then argue about whether the concept of causal connection was the right concept of connection in this context, and so on. Thinking about the author and the reader, rather than solely about the contents of the book, can set off such a torrent of questions. At least we can be confident that the author will be perfectly happy to have given us a meta-problem to ponder, whether he did so accidentally or deliberately.

The last section of the book is about ethics, and the tone changes. The gap between the dialogue in the book and how a discussion might go in a philosophy class shrinks. This is a reminder that ethical issues arise in all of our lives, so that a direct presentation of the issues can engage anyone. It is not only philosophers who see that the issues are important. But this change of tone is no let-down. Like the train blending smoothly into the dusk at the end of the book, the book blends philosophy smoothly into the life of the reader. This is a serious book that is also a lot of fun.

Tetralogue: I'm Right, You're Wrong, by Timothy Williamson. Oxford University Press, 2015, 160 pages, hardback £10.99. ISBN 978-0-19-872888-7.

Publisher's web page:

Friday, 28 February 2014

Open access publication

In a recent incident, a number of fake academic papers, which were computer-generated gibberish, got published (and then withdrawn when the problem was spotted). Nature's account is here:

It is all very entertaining. It is also not surprising that there should be occasional incidents like this, when so much gets published, and appropriate peer reviewers may be in short supply. At least we can hope that when a paper is gibberish, as opposed to merely bad, even a first year student would be able to see that it was gibberish. That is, there should be an effective control at the point of reading.

But is this a problem that could be solved, at least partially, by the purest form of the open access approach to academic publishing, an approach that is in any case gaining ground?

I have in mind the free publication of papers on websites, in ways that make them freely accessible, rather than in traditional journals. This is happening anyway. The arXiv, , sets a particularly high standard of organization and ease of use, including the tracking of revisions of papers, but there are other worthy sites too. Such sites do need funding: the arXiv is funded by Cornell University Library and others. But the expense must be modest, compared to the immense value of the service.

Often, a paper published in this way is a draft, not the final version, which will typically appear in a traditional journal and will be the version of record, the version for others to cite. Publication in a traditional journal creates expense, either for the author, or for libraries or individual readers. Some of that expense is justified, because the selection of papers, the organization of peer review and the checking of formatting takes effort - although reviewers themselves are not likely to be paid, and the rise of LaTeX and stylesheets to use with it means that formatting, and the checking of it, involves much less work than it used to require. But some publishers exploit the prestige of their journals, and the ability to deny online access to past years' editions if one stops paying the subscription, in order to make very large profits, at the expense of university libraries who could otherwise use the money elsewhere.

The obvious solution would be to move to free online publication of the version of record of each paper, and to buy permanent open access to past years' editions of journals with one-off payments to publishers.

But what would then happen to quality control?

It could be imposed by all who read papers - and open access would greatly increase the pool of potential readers, improving the effectiveness of this form of quality control. A well-organized website could allow readers to rate papers on a simple scale, and to leave comments. Ideally, the raters and commentators should be identified, and should be allowed to rate one another, so that expert commentators (as identified by the ratings of others) found that their ratings and comments carried more weight than those of people without such recognition. Indeed, people who were highly rated should have their ratings of other commentators given more weight than the ratings of commentators that were given by those who were not themselves highly rated.

There would be interesting problems here in the design of voting systems. How could the risk of conspiracies to distort the voting be minimized? (The risk could not be eliminated, unless an authority imposed weights by reference to a list of approved academics.) But something that was good enough should be possible.

But what about the academic job market, the allocation of research grants, and so on? Lists of publications in prestigious journals currently form important parts of applications. Here, I think there is not much difficulty. An application would include links to papers, and to the comments on them. Those who allocated jobs and grants would know whose comments were most worthy of note. They would then have the advantage of often having more than one opinion on the applicant's work. And one would also eliminate the unfairness that springs from the current element of luck in publication. Luck arises because each journal can publish far fewer papers than are submitted, and is therefore likely to reject papers that were just as worthy of publication as the accepted ones. Finally, any papers by an applicant that had not been exposed to open comment in this way would be treated with suspicion by the allocators of jobs and of grants, encouraging a fairly rapid shift to the system.

So how would this solve the problem of fake papers? The first people to look at such a paper would simply leave comments to the effect that it was gibberish. It would then be ignored by the academic community.

Finally, why should we cut out commercial publishers? Why is the purest form of open access publishing the most desirable form in this context, apart from the obvious point that it would allow universities to make better use of their funds? The answer is that if there is no commercial interest, there is no reason to design a system that would be any other than the best system for the academic purposes of honest appraisal and the encouragement of good work. A commercial publisher would always have an urge to control adverse comment on papers that it had published, and to solicit favourable comment from prestigious commentators. Good publishers would resist the urge, but it would be safer to take money out of the system altogether.

Friday, 25 October 2013

Government accountability and freedom of information

Gus O'Donnell, Cabinet Secretary until the end of 2011, has made waves recently by making proposals for improving the government of the UK which include vetting prospective MPs before they stand for Parliament. Amongst the responses has been an excellent one from Douglas Carswell, calling for accountability in the other direction: we the electorate, and backbench MPs, need to be able to hold civil servants and ministers to account. His piece is available at:

It is, however, difficult to hold a government to account, unless we can see what considerations ministers and civil servants have weighed, and how they have reached their decisions. Unfortunately, there is a major obstacle to that in the exemptions from disclosure of documents that are conferred by Freedom of Information Act 2000, sections 35 - Formation of government policy, etc and 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs. As a rule, we cannot get to see the policy papers that go back and forth among civil servants, and between them and ministers, and which show what evidence was considered and how decisions were reached. If the exemptions were abolished, MPs, journalists and the public could see the papers, and would have a valuable way to keep tabs on civil servants and on ministers.

The traditional argument is that if these papers had to be disclosed, that would inhibit free and frank discussion among civil servants, and between them and ministers. We should not accept this argument. Everyone would know in advance that such papers would be full of odd policy ideas that got rejected as silly, uncertainties about data (which should be disclosed anyway), queries over the value of evidence received from external consultees, and mentions of factors that might be seen either as risks of policies, or as advantages of them, depending on one's political stance. We know that the policy formation process is messy, and we would not think any the less of governments if we had confirmation of that fact. The worst consequence would be a bit of political embarrassment, and that matters far less than our ability to see whether the people we pay to run the public sector, and to formulate legislation, are doing a good job.

One might fear that there would be too much paper, through which to plough, and no good way to identify the key documents quickly. There would also be the difficulty of wording freedom of information requests so as to find out what was wanted. If such a request asks for the wrong thing, or leaves it open to the relevant department to supply very little information, the response can very easily not be what the person who made the request wanted.

These difficulties could, however, be overcome if external users had access to departmental document management systems, so they could search the stock of documents themselves. The official response to such a radical move might well be, "But then you might get access to personal data on taxpayers, or NHS patients, or litigants". But it is unlikely that this would really be a problem. It would not be difficult to tag documents as needing redaction before they could be accessed - although there would need to be severe disciplinary measures against civil servants who were found to be tagging everything, just so as to make life difficult for outsiders.

Will any of this happen? Maybe not. But if enough backbenchers from all parties wanted it to happen, they could force it on those who are in government, or who are on the Opposition front bench and hope that they will in due course be in government.

Thursday, 12 September 2013

The life without examination

In the Apology, at 38a5, Plato famously reports Socrates as saying that the unexamined life is not worth living. At least, that is the standard English translation. But every now and then, someone contests the claim. Why should a life be worthless if it is wholly outward-looking, devoid of introspection? (We may note in passing that "not worth living" may be too strong a translation. "Not the sort of life one should live" would be a possible reading.)

Sometimes, when I have seen this view, or some related view, I have wondered out loud about the translation. (Examples where I have commented are Brian Leiter's blog on 17 January 2012, and Stephen Law's blog on 12 September 2013 - original post dated 7 September.)

I put my thoughts here now, in the hope that some expert in Plato's Greek may have a view. I am not such an expert, so my own thoughts are mere speculation.

My concern is the word "anexetastos". This is the word that is standardly translated as "unexamined", with the implication that it is one's own life that needs examining. Liddell and Scott (the big one, colloquially known as the Great Scott) gives two meanings:

(a) not searched out, not inquired into or examined;

(b) without inquiry or investigation.

This dictionary refers to Apology 38a5 in giving the latter meaning.

An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon (the Middle Liddell) reinforces the point by giving (a) not inquired into or examined, (b) uninquiring, and again links Plato to the latter meaning, although without a reference to the Apology.

On the scope for a verbal adjective to have both active and passive meanings, see Smyth's Greek Grammar, page 157, paragraph 472.

Liddell and Scott's decision to link Plato to (b) and not (a) does not in itself prove anything. I assume that they simply followed the opinion of Plato scholars as to the translation. But if (b) were the meaning to adopt, Socrates' prescription would look rather different. It would amount to saying that you should enquire into things and strive to find out the truth about the world. You might yourself be a main object of your enquiry, or you might turn your gaze outwards, making enquiries in physics, natural history, geography, philosophy, or whatever else was of interest. The prescription would amount to an injunction not to be slothful intellectually, but to pursue knowledge and understanding.

Monday, 2 September 2013

Most recent common ancestor

There has been a pause in my blogging. I have been engrossed in other work. The pause may last for a while longer. So here is a little puzzle, as an entr'acte.

According to Wikipedia, Elizabeth of York, wife of Henry VII, is the most recent common ancestor of all English monarchs. I have not checked this claim, but let us assume that it is correct. The puzzle, which we would need to solve before checking the correctness of the claim, is as follows.

How should we define "most recent common ancestor" in this context, so that a determinate person, or a determinate couple, is picked out, and so that it is interesting that this person, or this couple, is picked out?

The condition of interest would be failed if our definition led us to pick out George VI, or even if it led us to pick out George V, or Victoria. We want some sense of "furthest back most recent". But then, we must not allow Elizabeth of York's mother, Elizabeth Woodville, to displace her.

Technical terms from mathematics may be used freely.

Blogspot does not, so far as I know, support LaTeX math environment, so please feel free either to cut and paste logical symbols from elsewhere, or to use E for the existential quantifier, V for the universal quantifier, - for negation, and > for implication.